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INNOVATION AND 
NEGATION
Steven Shaviro
Multitude: Between Innovation and 
Negation by Paolo Virno. Trans. 
Isabella Bertoletti, James Cascaito, 
and Andrea Casson. Los Angeles: 
Semiotext(e), 2008. Pp. 188. $14.95 
paper.
Paolo Virno’s newly translated book, 
Multitude: Between Innovation and 
Negation, is somewhat misleadingly 
titled, since it has very little to say 
about the concept of the multitude 
as featured in Virno’s previously 
translated book, as well as in the 
work of Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri. Rather, it is a text composed 
of three essays: a longish one about 
jokes and the logic of innovation, 
fl anked by two much shorter ones 
that deal with the ambivalent legacy 
of humanity’s linguistic powers.
The fi rst essay argues against the 
notion, crystallized by Carl Schmitt 
but held more generally in the “common 
sense” of political philosophy and 
conceptual thought (from Hob-
bes, we might say, through Freud, 
right down to Steven Pinker), that 
any democratic or liberatory politi-
cal theory is founded in the naïve 
view that human nature is innately 
harmonious and good, whereas the 
more “realistic” view of the human 
capacity for “evil” mandates belief 
in a strong and repressive state. Virno 
argues, to the contrary, that if we are 
to worry about the “evil” in human 
nature—which is really our “open-
ness to the world,” or our underde-
termination by our biology, which 
is what makes it possible for us to 
have “a virtually unlimited species-
specifi c ambivalence”—then we have 
all the more reason to worry about 
what happens when the power to 
act (to do evil as well as to mitigate 
it) is concentrated in something like 
the state’s “monopoly of violence.”
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Theorists of the state, from Hob-
bes to Schmitt, posit the transition 
from a state of nature to a civil state, 
involving the rule of a sovereign (in 
the conservative version), or the rule 
of law (in the liberal version), as a 
defense against this innate aggres-
siveness that would be endemic to 
the state of nature. But Virno says 
that this transition is never com-
plete; even a sovereignty based on 
laws still has to declare a “state of 
exception” in order to maintain its 
rule; and this state of exception is, in 
effect, a return to the never-surpassed 
“state of nature.” The state of ex-
ception is a state in which rules are 
never fi rm, but are themselves sub-
ject to change and reinvention. We 
move back from the fi xed rules to 
the human situation that gave rise 
to them in the fi rst place. Though 
the “state of exception” has often 
been described as the totalitarian 
danger of our current situation, it is 
also a state in which the multitude 
can itself elaborate new practices 
and new forms of invention.
The third essay in the book makes 
a similar argument, in a somewhat 
simpler form. Sympathy with oth-
ers of our kind is an innate biologi-
cal endowment of our species—here 
Virno makes reference to recent 
discoveries involving mirror neu-
rons. But language frees us, for both 
good and ill, from this state of sym-
pathy. Language gives us the power 
of negation, which is the ability to 
deny the humanity of the other (the 
Jew, the “Musselman,” the nonwhite) 
and hence to torture and kill them 
mercilessly. Since there is no possi-
bility of returning to a prelinguistic 
state, the only solution to this poten-
tiality for evil is to potentialize lan-
guage to a further level, make it go 
meta-, have it refl ect back on itself, 
in a “negation of the negation.” The 
power to objectify and kill is also 
the power to heal, to establish “re-
ciprocal recognition.” Just as the state 
of exception is the ambivalent locus 
both of tyrannical imposition and of 
democratic redemption, so the 
potentiality of language is the am-
bivalent locus both of murderous 
destruction and of the elaboration 
of community, or of the multitude.
But both of these essays are little 
more than footnotes to the long cen-
tral essay, “Jokes and Innovative 
Action,” that comprises most of the 
book. Virno rather curiously takes 
Freud’s book on jokes as his pri-
mary text, despite disclaiming any 
interest in the Freudian theory of 
the unconscious. All of his exam-
ples of jokes come from Freud, but 
he reclassifi es these jokes in terms 
of their status as public acts of ex-
pression (“performative utterances” 
in a way, though precisely they do 
not positively refer back to institu-
tions in the way that a performative 
utterance like “I sentence you to a 
year in prison” does), as gestures that 
disrupt the “normal” functioning of 
a rule, and as “paralogisms” (logical 
fallacies, or defective syllogisms).
The point behind all these classi-
fi cations is a Wittgensteinian one. 
Most of the time, in “normal” situa-
tions, we apply rules to concrete 
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situations unproblematically. But in 
fact a rule is never suffi cient to dic-
tate how it is to be applied in any 
situation whatsoever—any attempt 
to do so involves making a second 
rule to explain how to apply the fi rst 
rule, then a third rule to explain 
how to apply the second rule, and so 
on in an infi nite regress. There is al-
ways an incommensurability be-
tween abstract rules and pragmatic 
acts of applying those rules. We 
have to appeal, as Wittgenstein 
says, to actual practices in a given 
“form of life.” But these forms of 
life are themselves subject to change. 
A joke is a disruptive intervention 
in this process; it introduces an “ab-
errant” application of a rule, thus 
exposing to view the inherent in-
commensurability between rule and 
application. It throws us back upon 
the “form of life” in which the lan-
guage game of which the rule is a 
part is embedded. It exposes the 
contingency of the form of life, the 
way it could be otherwise. It returns 
us to what Wittgenstein calls “the 
common behavior of humankind.”
Virno interprets this “common 
behavior” to be our species-specifi c 
biological endowment (basic “hu-
man nature”)—or the “regularities” 
of human behavior that ultimately 
underlie all rules, but which ex-
plicit rules cannot fully encompass. 
The gap between an explicit rule 
and the way we can apply it refers 
back to this prior gap between rules 
and the regularities upon which they 
are based, but which they are never 
able to encompass. This is in turn 
the case because Virno, as we have 
seen, defi nes basic human, species-
specifi c, and biological regularities 
not as a fi xed “nature” but precisely as 
an underdetermination, a reservoir of 
potentiality—something whose in-
completeness can only be given 
fi xed form by the still-more-inde-
terminate, and still-more-open-to-
potentiality, power of language. 
Language is what fi xes our biologi-
cal potentiality into specifi c forms, 
but it is also (as jokes witness) what 
allows us to rupture any given fi x-
ity and reconfi gure things other-
wise. Wittgenstein’s return to the 
“regularity” of empirically observed 
human nature as the court of last ap-
peal for what cannot be guaranteed 
or grounded by rational argument is 
also a kind of return to the state-of-
exception-as-state-of-nature, or to 
the moment when language fi rst 
emerges out of our innate drives, 
both reshaping and giving form to 
these drives, and opening them up to 
a still more radical indeterminacy.
Virno claims that this is what is 
happening, in miniature, in jokes 
when they twist intentions and 
laws, multiply meanings, and turn 
seemingly fi xed principles into their 
opposites, or into sheer absurdity. 
He therefore takes the joke as a 
miniaturized version, or as a par-
adigm case, of innovation and cre-
ativity in general. The way that jokes 
play with and disrupt previously 
fi xed and accepted meanings is a 
small version of the way that any 
form of social innovation or cre-
ativity alters relations that were 
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previously taken for granted or seen 
as fi xed.
Ultimately, Virno says that jokes 
and all forms of social innovation 
play on the indeterminacy between 
grammatical statements and empiri-
cal statements—an indeterminacy 
that is the major focus of Wittgen-
stein’s last writing, collected in the 
volume On Certainty. Wittgenstein 
says, on the one hand, that certain 
statements are not in themselves ei-
ther true or false, because they ex-
press the presuppositions that we 
are already taking for granted and 
pointing back to when we make any 
judgment of truth or falsity. For 
Wittgenstein, it is a weird category 
error to assert the truth of a state-
ment like “I know that I have two 
hands,” because we do not “know” 
this so much as we already presup-
pose it whenever we learn some-
thing, or come to know something. 
My sense of having two hands is 
precognitive (which is precisely why 
I do not have to check all the time to 
make sure that I really do have two 
hands, neither more nor less).
On the other hand, however, and 
at the same time, Wittgenstein says 
that this pre-knowledge is not abso-
lute. Over time, there can be shifts 
in which sorts of statements are em-
pirical ones (that can be true or false), 
and which statements are founda-
tional or grammatical ones (already 
presupposed in an act of cognition). 
I might lose one of my hands in a 
horrible accident, for instance. Or 
some empirical fact might become 
so central to my understanding of 
everything that it would come to 
take on the form of a pre-assumed 
(grammatical) statement, rather than 
a merely empirical one. These things 
can and do change over the course 
of time. One language game morphs 
or mutates into a different one. For 
Virno, this is where social inno-
vation takes place. Jokes are the 
simplest example of such a process 
of change: one in which “an openly 
‘fallacious’ conjecture . . . reveals in 
a fl ash a different way of applying 
the rules of the game” (163), and 
thereby changes the nature of the 
game altogether, or allows us to 
stop playing one game and to play 
a different one instead. Virno ex-
pands this reading, in order to sug-
gest that it really comprises a theory 
of crisis in Wittgenstein, so that his 
naturalism is something more than 
just a passive cataloging of various 
“forms of life”—something, he 
says, that is “stubbornly ignored by 
all of Wittgenstein’s scholars” (163).
How useful and convincing is 
all of this? To my mind, the best 
part of Virno’s argument is the last 
thing I mentioned: his parsing 
of Wittgenstein on the shadowy 
and always-changing boundary 
between the “grammatical” and the 
“empirical.” I think this is a more 
informal and naturalistic version of 
what Deleuze calls “transcendental 
empiricism.” At any given moment 
there is a transcendental fi eld that 
determines what is possible and 
what is not, and that delineates for 
us the shape of the empirical (which 
cannot be interpreted without it). 
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At the same time, not only is this 
“transcendental fi eld” not an absolute 
(in Kant’s language, as transcenden-
tal it is precisely not transcendent), 
but it is also itself something that 
has an empirical genesis within 
time, and that varies through time.
Now, doubtless this always-open 
possibility of shifting the boundary 
between the empirical and the tran-
scendental, or of turning one into 
the other, is where creativity and in-
novation are located. The bad, or 
mainstream, interpretation of Kant 
is the one that always insists upon 
the necessity of separating the 
transcendental (the regulative, the 
norm) from the empirical—that is 
how you get Habermas, for instance. 
A much better Kantianism is the 
one—it can be found explicitly in 
Lyotard, for instance; and I would 
argue that it also works implicitly in 
Whitehead and in Deleuze—that 
sees the gap or incommensurability 
between the transcendental/regu-
lative and the empirical not as a 
barrier so much as a space that is 
suffi ciently open as to allow for in-
novative trans formation.
So to this extent I fi nd Virno’s 
formulations (including his reading 
of Wittgenstein) extremely useful. 
But I also fi nd his discussion curi-
ously bland and incomplete, and 
this because of its failure (due to its 
“naturalistic” orientation?) to say 
enough either about aesthetics, or 
about political economy. I think, 
on the one hand, that the view of cre-
ativity and innovation implicit in Vir-
no’s discussion needs to be thought 
at greater length within the frame-
work of a post-Kantian aesthetics, 
and that this aesthetics needs to be 
affi rmed precisely against the temp-
tation (all too common in current 
academic discourse) to render it in 
“ethical” terms. (This is an argu-
ment that needs to be set forth in 
detail, but I lack the space to do it 
here). On the other hand, I fi nd 
Virno’s silence on matters of politi-
cal economy quite disappointing 
in someone who explicitly presents 
himself as a Marxist or post-Marxist 
philosopher. Rather than deepening 
a sense of how we might under-
stand the “multitude” in the frame-
work of contemporary global cap-
italism, Virno opts for a much vaguer, 
and context-free, understanding of 
how social and cultural change is 
possible. He prefers to speak in 
terms of the state, and of the foun-
dations of law and sovereignty, rather 
than in terms of modes and rela-
tions of production. I know my po-
sition here is an unpopular one, but 
I am enough of a “vulgar Marxist” 
to think that these sorts of political-
philosophy distinctions are too vague 
and abstract to have any sort of trac-
tion when they are separated from 
“economic” considerations. (Again, 
this is an argument that needs to be 
pursued at greater length than I have 
the space to do here.)
But the limitations of Virno’s ar-
gument in this respect are most evi-
dent when he discusses the forms of 
social change. Basically, he lists two. 
One of them is “exodus”: the Israel-
ites, faced with the choice between 
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submitting to the Pharaoh and re-
belling against him, instead made 
the oblique move of leaving Egypt 
altogether. This, for Virno, is the 
exemplary situation of changing the 
parameters of what is possible, chang-
ing the rules of the game instead of 
just moving within an already-given 
game or form of life. The obvious 
reference, beyond the Bible, is to the 
Italian “autonomist” movement of 
the 1960s/1970s, which is the point of 
origin for Virno’s thought just as it is 
for Negri’s. Now, much as I admire 
the emphasis on obliqueness rather 
than on dialectical oppositions, I 
also suspect that the idea of “exo-
dus” is a too easy one—in the sense 
that when capitalism subsumes all 
aspects of contemporary life, outside 
the factory as well as inside, it is actu-
ally as diffi cult to fi nd a point of 
exodus as it is easy to make the 
declaration that one is doing so. 
“Lateral thinking” is a business buzz-
word more than an anticapitalist 
strategy. Things like “open software” 
and “creative commons” copyright 
licenses are not anywhere near as 
radical as they sound—if anything, 
they not only coexist easily with a 
capitalist economy, but also presup-
pose a capitalist economy for their 
functioning. All too often, what we 
celebrate as escapes from the capi-
talist machine in fact work as com-
fortable niches within it.
But Virno’s other form of change, 
“innovation,” is even more problem-
atic. It seems to me to be symptomatic 
that Virno introduces his discus-
sion of what he calls entrepreneurial 
innovation with the disclaimer that 
this involves “a meaning of the term 
‘entrepreneur’ that is quite dist-
inct from the sickening and odious 
meaning of the word that is preva-
lent among the apologists of the 
capitalist mode of production” (148); 
and yet, immediately after this ca-
veat, he goes on to explain what he 
means by “entrepreneurial innova-
tion” by referring to the authority of 
Joseph Schumpeter, the one theorist 
of the entire twentieth century who 
is most responsible for the “sicken-
ing and odious” meaning that Virno 
ostensibly rejects. Virno insists that, 
for Schumpeter, “it would be a mis-
take to confuse the entrepreneur 
with the CEO of a capitalistic enter-
prise, or even worse, with its owner.” 
This is because, for Schumpeter, en-
trepreneurism is “a basically human 
aptitude . . . a species-specifi c fac-
ulty.” However, this disclaimer will 
not stand. On the one hand, the en-
trepreneur is not the same as the 
CEO or owner, only because the 
former refers to a moment of “in-
vention,” whereas the latter refers 
to an already-established enterprise. 
When the businessman ceases to in-
novate actively, and instead simply 
reaps the fruits of his market domi-
nance, then he has become a CEO 
instead of an entrepreneur. Bill 
Gates was a Schumpeterian entre-
preneur in the 1970s; by the 1990s 
he had become just another CEO. 
The owners of Google, whose in-
novations surpassed those of Mi-
crosoft, are now making the same 
transition. Even if the entrepreneur 
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is not yet a CEO, his actions are in-
telligible only in the framework of 
a capitalist economy. If the entre-
preneur is successful, then he inev-
itably becomes a CEO. To say that 
Schumpeterian entrepreneurship is 
a basic human aptitude is precisely to 
say (as Virno doesn’t want to say) 
that capitalism is intrinsic to, and 
inevitably a part of, human nature.
I think that Virno’s reference to 
Schumpeter is symptomatic, be-
cause it offers the clearest example 
of how he fumbles what seems to 
me to be one of the great issues of 
our age, which is, precisely, how to 
disarticulate notions of creativity 
and innovation and the new from 
their current hegemony in the busi-
ness schools and in the ways that 
actually existing capitalism truly 
functions. Virno fails to work through 
this disarticulation, precisely because 
he has already preassumed it. I 
myself don’t claim by any means to 
have solved this problem—the fact 
that we can neither give up on in-
novation, creativity, and the new, 
nor accept the way that the relent-
less demand for them is precisely 
the motor that drives capitalism 
and blocks any other form of social 
and economic organization from be-
ing even minimally thinkable—but 
I feel that Virno fails to acknowl-
edge it suffi ciently as a problem. In 
consequence, for all that his specu-
lation in this book offers a response 
to the Hobbesian or Schmittian glo-
rifi cation of the state, it doesn’t offer 
any response to the far more serious 
problem of our subordination to the 
relentless machinery, or monstrous 
body, of capital accumulation.
—Wayne State University

